Osborn v. Osborn [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
3-1-1954
Osborn v. Osborn [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Osborn v. Osborn [DISSENT]" (1954). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 276.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/276
358 OsBORN v. OsBORN [42 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22540. In Bank. Ma!'. 1, 1954.] 
MERINOETH R. OSBORN, Appellant, v. LOUISE L. 
OSBORN, Respondent. 
[1] Deeds-Delivery-Deposit for Delivery After Grantor's Death. 
-Deposit of deed granting an estate in fee simple, with in-
structions that it be transmitted to grantee on grantor's death, 
conveys a remainder interest in fee simple with life estate 
reserved in grantor if grantor intended deposit to be irre-
vocable. 
[2] Escrows-Effect of Escrow: Time When Instrument Becomes 
Effective.-Where a deed is deposited in escrow pursuant to 
binding contract of sale of a remainder, the grantee, at time 
of execution of contract of sale, acquires an equitable title to 
estate being sold, and grantor retains legal title as security 
for purchase price; and the legal title passes to grantee at 
time of his completion of conditions precedent, whether or not 
escrow holder gives him physical possession of the deed. 
[3] !d.-Delivery to Depositary.-Grantor's delivery of deed to 
escrow holder is absolute and cannot be disaffirmed after 
grantee's performance of escrow conditions. 
[4a, 4b] Deeds-Delivery-Deposit for Delivery After Grantor's 
Death.-Where deed from father to son was executed pursuant 
to a binding contract supported by adequate consideration and 
on its face reserved a life estate to father and granted re-
mainder to son, and where, at time father delivered deed to 
trustees, there were no conditions precedent for son to perform, 
the provision that trustees should hold deed until father's death 
was not a condition precedent to passage of legal title; legal 
title was conveyed when deed was delivered to trustees. 
[5] Id.-Delivery-Intent.-Whether a deed has been delivered is 
a question of intent. 
[6] Id.-Delivery-Intent.-While in some cases to ascertain 
grantor's intent it is necessary to have recourse to his acts 
and declarations both before and after his transmission of 
deed to grantee or a third party, when grantor's only instruc-
tions are in writing, effect of trans~ction depends on true 
' 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Deeds, § 70; Am.Jur., Deeds, § 143 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Escrows, § 16; Am.Jur., Escrows, § 25 et seq. 
[5] See Cal.Jur., Deeds, §52; Am.Jur., Deeds, § 116 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Deeds,§ 80(1); [2] Escrows,§§ 2, 22; 
[3] Escrows,§ 9; [4, 7] Deeds,§ 81(1); [5, 6] Deeds,§ 66(1); [8] 
Deeds, § 66(7); [9] Deeds, § 75; [10] Deeds, § 149; [11] Appeal 
and Error, § 1409; [12] Appeal and Error, § 1357. 
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construction of the writing, in which case it is a pure question 
of law whether or not there was an absolute delivery. 
[7] !d.-Delivery-Deposit for Delivery After Grantor's Death.-
Where deed by which father granted property to son subject 
to life estate in father was delivered to trustees pursuant to 
provisions of a trust agreement and nothing remained to be 
done to vest legal title to remainder in son, father was bound 
by terms of trust agreement, executed contemporaneously 
with deed, not to attempt to recall deed from possession of 
trustees. 
[8] !d.-Delivery-Surrender of ControL-Grantor did not retain 
control over deed after he delivered it to trustees where there 
was nothing in or external to trust agreement pursuant to 
which deed was executed, to indicate that he did not intend 
transmission of deed to be a valid legal delivery, where whole 
tenor of such agreement was that he intended to grant his 
son a presently vested remainder interest, where in a prior 
"stipulation" executed with his son he promised that he would 
execute documents necessary to transfer a remainder interest 
to son, and where trust agreement contained a number of 
restrictions on grantor's right to use property during his life-
time. 
[9] Id.-Delivery-Intent.-Grantor's conduct, after execution of 
deed granting realty to son subject to life estate in grantor 
and delivery of deed to trustees, in requesting assignee of 
creditor to sell certificate from execution sale of son's interest 
in property and in negotiating with son (after execution sale) 
for purchase of his interest in property, is corroborative of 
grantor's intent, as revealed in a "stipulation" and trust 
agreement executed with son, to grant son a presently vested 
remainder interest. 
[10] Id.-Reservations.-Grantor's reservation of right to revoke 
deed giving grantee a vested remainder interest, in event that 
grantee should harm grantor or refuse to carry out terms of 
trust agreement executed contemporaneously with deed, does 
not make delivery to trustees conditional so that no estate 
vests in grantee by virtue of deposit with trustees, but merely 
limits future interest created to a vested remainder subject 
to being divested on happening of a condition subsequent. 
[11] Appeal-Determination-Partial ReversaL-The failure to 
take an appeal demonstrates only satisfaction with judgment 
as is, not as changed by a partial reversal; one may elect to 
stand on a judgment which he believes does not give him all 
of benefits to which he is entitled, and he may be persuaded 
to permit unfavorable portions to stand in reliance on benefits 
received in the other parts, in which instance, to do justice 
a reversal of portion from which appeal was taken might 
require a reversal of other provisions. 
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[12] !d.-Determination-Scope and Extent of Relief.-Where 
both parts of judgment embrace identical issue of whether 
plaintiff acquired a remainder interest under deed, and where 
Supreme Court's decision that remainder interest passed under 
deed removes basis of trial comt's decision adverse to de-
fendant, who did not appeal, a complete reversal of judgment 
is appropriate, in order that defendant may have opportunity 
to establish her claim that an execution sale of plaintiff's re-
mainder interest was valid. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Ben V. Curler, Judge.* Reversed. 
Action to quiet title to real property, in which defendant 
filed cross-complaint for similar relief. Judgment adverse 
to plaintiff on original complaint and for plaintiff on cross-
complaint, reversed. 
Guerin & Guerin and John J. Guerin for Appellant. 
Louis Warren for Respondent. 
TR.A YNOR, J.-Plaintiff lVIerinoeth Osborn appeals from 
an adverse judgment on his complaint to quiet title to cer-
tain real property in Los Angeles County, known as Lot 97 
of the Casa Verduga Villa Tract. Defendant Louise Osborn, 
plaintiff's stepmother, answered and cross-complained to have 
title to Lot 97 quieted in her. Judgment was entered for 
plaintiff on the cross-complaint, and defendant Louise Osborn 
has not appealed therefrom. The other defendants named in 
the complaint disclaim any interest in the property. 
Lot 97 was originally acquired by lVIerinoeth 's mother, 
Chloie Osborn, in 1922. Chloie died intestate leaving her 
husband, Thomas D. Osborn, and their son, lVIerinoeth, snr-
vlvmg. On June 27, 1939, during the administration of 
Chloie 's estate, Merinoeth and Thomas executed a "Stipula-
tion,'' subsequently approved by the court, to resolve their 
conflicting claims to Chloie 's estate. The material part of 
this stipulation follows : "It is furtHer stipulated and agreed 
by and between the parties hereto that upon execution of the 
within Stipulation that 'l'homas D. Osborn will exeeute either 
by deed contraet or declaration of trust sufficient documents, 
conveyances or declarations so that the property known as 
[;ot 97, Casa Verduga Villa Tract, will be retained m 
* A~signed by Chairman of Judicial Couneil. 
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the name of Thomas D. Osborn, during his lifetime and that 
the same should vest in his son Merinoeth R Osborn at the 
time of the demise of the said 'l'homas D. Osborn." After the 
execution of the stipulation, the probate conrt diRtributed 
Lot 97 to Thomas. 
On July 7, 1939, pursuant to the stipulation, Thomas and 
lVIerinoeth executed a trust agreement, and Thomas executed 
a deed ''in accordance with the terms and conditions of that 
certain trust agreement of July 7th, 1939, ... and ... sub-
Ject to all conditions, exceptions and reservations as in said 
trust agreement provided." (Italics added.) The deed 
granted Lot 97 to Merinoeth subject to a life estate in 
'rhomas. The trust agreement provided that the deed to Lot 
97 ''shall be turned over and delivered to the Trustees to hold 
and keep possession of said deed, not to record the same dur-
ing the lifetime of'' Thomas. The trustees were instructed 
to "turn over and deliver" the deed to Merinoeth on the 
death of Thomas. It was recited in the trust agreement 
that Thomas reserved a life estate in the property, and that 
he also reserved "the right to revoke the deed in the event 
[Merinoeth] wilfully harms [Thomas], and [Merinoeth] re-
serves the right to cancel this agreement if [Thomas] wil-
fully harms" him. (Italics added.) Other material parts 
of the trust agreement are: "The parties hereto further 
agree that in the event any attempt is made by either party 
hereto to break the terms of the within trust agreement, or 
to force the trustees to surrender the within described deed 
prior to the demise of [Thomas] by court action, or other 
proceedings, then, in that event, the party attempting to break 
the terms of the within trust agreement, shall pay in addition 
to expenses and court costs, a reasonable attorney's fee to 
the said trustees. The parties hereto further anthorize and 
instruct the t1·ustees herein mentioned to defend any attempts 
made by either parties hereto to break the terms of the within 
trust agreement, or to force the trustees to surrender the 
within described deed . ... The wilfull failure or refusal on 
the party [sic] of either party hereto to carry ont the terms 
and conditions of the within trust agreement, or the wilful! 
refusal or failure of either party to comply with the obliga-
tions herein provided, on his part to be performed, shall per-
mit either party to rescind this agreement and shall confer 
upon the grantor the right to cancel the within mentioned 
deed and this agreement by a declaration duly executed and 
recorded with the formality of a deed and a thirty day writ-
362 OsBORN v. OsBORN [42 C.2d 
ten notice thereof served· on the grantee, or his attorney.'' 
(Italics added.) The deed was deposited with defendants 
Franklin and Warner, who were named as trustees in the 
trust agreement. 
Merinoeth had become indebted to \¥ arner for legal services 
in the probate of Chloie 's estate and the preparation of the 
trust agreement. In 1941, Warner resigned as trustee and 
assigned his claim against Merinoeth to his secretary, Cham-
pion, who recovered judgment thereon. Execution was levied 
on Merinoeth 's interest in Lot 97, and the property was sold 
in 1942 to Champion for $336.37. Thereafter, at the request 
of Thomas, Champion transferred the certificate of sale to 
Louise Osborn for $415. Although Louise contends that Mer-
inoeth had notice of these proceedings, he made no appear-
ance and disclaims any knowledge of them. 
In anticipation of a sale of Merinoeth's interest in Lot 97 
to Thomas, an agreement purporting to cancel the trust agree-
ment was executed on January 14, 1946 and then cancelled 
in March 1946. Thomas died intestate on December 31, 1946, 
leaving his second wife, Louise, and Merinoeth surviving. 
Merinoeth 's subsequent demand upon the trustees for the 
deed executed by Thomas was refused. 
In refusing to quiet title in either Merinoeth or Louise, the 
trial court concluded that Merinoeth had not acquired any 
interest in Lot 97 under the deed executed by Thomas and 
deposited with Warner and Franklin. Since Merinoeth had 
acquired no interest, the court concluded that Louise acquired 
none by reason of the execution sale. 
Plaintiff's basic contention on this appeal is that the trial 
court erred in holding that he acquired no interest in Lot 97 
under the deed executed by Thomas and deposited with War-
ner and Franklin to be transmitted to him on the death of 
Thomas. Plaintiff contends that the deposit with Warner 
and Franklin constituted a valid delivery immediately vest-
ing in him a remainder interest in the property. The first 
issue to be resolved, therefore, is the validity and effect of thP 
deed executed by Thomas. 
[1] It has long been established in this state that the de· 
posit of a deed granting an estate in fee simple, with instruc-
tions that it be transmitted to the grantee upon the death 
of the grantor, conveys a remainder interest in fee simple 
with a life estate reserved in the grantor, if the grantor in-
tended the deposit to be irrevocable. (Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 
446, 451-452 [33 P. 338, 35 Am.St.Rep. 186] ; H1tnt v. Wicht, 
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174 Cal. 205, 206-208 [162 P. 639, L.R.A. 1917C 961]; Wil-
kerson v Seib, 20 Cal.2d 556, 560 [127 P.2d 904].) There-
sult is the same as if the grantor delivered to the grantee a 
deed reserving a life estate and granting a remainder in fee. 
[2] The same result is also accomplished by the deposit of 
a deed in escrow pursuant to a binding contract of sale of 
a remainder and the grantee's performance of the condi-
tions of the escrow. At the time of the execution of the contract 
of sale, the grantee acquires an equitable title to the estate 
being sold; the grantor retains the legal title as security 
for the purchase price. The legal title passes to the grantee 
at the time of his completion of the conditions precedent, 
whether or not the escrow holder gives him physical posses-
sion of the deed; [3] the grantor's delivery to the escrow holder 
is absolute and cannot thereafter be disaffirmed. (Cannon 
v. Handley, 72 Cal. 133, 140 [13 P. 315] ; McDonald v. Huff, 
77 Cal. 279, 282 [19 P. 499]; Bradbury v. Davenport, 120 Cal. 
152, 154 [52 P. 301]; see, also, Hagge v. Drew, 27 Cal.2d 
368, 375 [165 P.2d 461] .) 
[4a] In the present case, the deed from Thomas to Mer-
inoeth was executed pursuant to a binding contract supported 
by adequate consideration. On the face of the deed, Thomas 
reserved a life estate and granted a remainder to Merinoeth. 
When Thomas delivered the deed to the trustees, there were 
no conditions precedent for Merinoeth to perform. Thomas 
had. received the consideration for the grant, when the com-
promise settlement of Chloie's estate was executed. The pro-
vision that the trustees should hold the deed until Thomas' 
death was not a condition precedent to the passage of legal 
title, for even in cases of gift, e.g., Bury v. Yottng, supra, an 
instruction that the depositary is to retain possession of the 
deed until the death of the grantor does not prevent the deed 
from being operative as a present conveyance. In this case, 
Merinoeth was not a donee; he was a purchaser for value, al-
ready vested with an equitable title to the remainder. The 
situation is thus analogous to that of a true escrow after the 
purchaser has performed all of the conditions precedent. Per-
formance of those conditions automatically vests the legal 
title in him, even though the escrow holder retains possession 
of the deed. 
Defendant contends, however, that Thomas did not make 
a legal delivery of the deed. [5] Delivery is a question of 
intent. [6] In some cases to ascertain the grantor's intent 
it is necessary to have recourse to his acts and declarations 
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both before and after his transmission of the deed to the 
grantee or a third party (Will1:arns v. Kicld, 170 Cal. 631, 649-
652 [151 P. 1, Ann.Cas. 1916E 703] ; Rice v. Carey, 170 Cal. 
748, 753-754 [151 P. 135]; Donahue v. Sweeney, 171 Cal. 3~8, 
391-392 [153 P. 708]; Northern Calif. Conference Assn. v. 
Srnith, 209 Cal. 26, 33 [285 P. 314]). When, as here, how-
ever, the grantor's "only instructions are in writing, the 
effect of the transaction depends upon the true construction 
of the writing. It is in other words a pure question of law 
whether there was an absolute delivery or not." (Moore v. 
Trott, 156 Cal. 353, 357 [104 P. 578, 134 Am.St.Rep. 131].) 
[7] Thomas executed the deed and delivered it to the trustees 
pursuant to the provisions of the trust agreement. It was a 
completed act and nothing remained to be done to vest the 
legal title to the remainder in Merinoeth. Thomas was bound 
by the terms of the trust agreement, executed contemporan-
eously with the deed, not to attempt to recall the deed from 
the possession of the trustees. The trustees were specifically 
instructed to resist any attempt by either Thomas or Meri-
noeth to obtain possession of the deed prior to the demise of 
Thomas, and were further instructed to hold the deed for the 
benefit of Merinoeth. Even if it had been contended that 
Merinoeth had harmed Thomas or failed to carry out the 
terms of the trust agreement and Thomas had wished to assert 
his right to revoke, he could not recall the deed; he had to 
execute and record a declaration of revocation with the for-
mality of a deed, after giving 30 days' notice thereof to 
Merinoeth, who might then defeat the proposed revocation by 
showing that there was no violation of the trust agreement. 
[8] It is clear, therefore, that Thomas. did not retain con-
trol over the deed after he delivered it to the trustees.· There 
is nothing in the trust agreement, or external to it, to indicate 
that Thomas did not intend the transmission of the deed to 
the trustees to be a valid legal delivery. Indeed, the whole 
tenor of the stipulation and the trust agreement is that Thomas 
intended to grant Merinoeth a presently vested remainder 
interest. In the stipulation of June 27th, Thomas promised 
that "upon execution of the within Stipulation" he would 
execute the documents necessary to transfer a remainder in-
terest to Merinoeth. The trust agreement contained a number 
of restrictions on Thomas' right to use the property during 
his lifetime. If Merinoeth was not to have a presently vested 
remainder interest, these provisions were superfluous. [9] Fur-
thermore, Thomas' conduct after the execution and delivery 
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of the deed, in requesting Champion to sell the certificate 
from the execution sale and in negotiating with Merinoeth 
in 1946 (after the execution sale) for the purchase of his inter-
est in the property for $3,500, is corroborative of 'l'homas' 
intent as revealed in the documents. 
Defendant contends, however, that Thomas' reservation of 
the right to' revoke the deed, in the event that Merinoeth 
harmed him or refused to carry out the terms of the trust 
agreement, made the delivery to the trustees conditional so 
that no estate vested in Merinoeth by virtue of the deposit of 
the deed with the trustees. This contention cannot be sus-
tained. [10] Thomas' right to revoke did not affect the 
delivery to the trustees, but merely limited the future inter-
est created to a vested remainder subject to being divested 
upon the happening of a condition subsequent. The situation 
is similar to that in Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 
167 Cal. 570 [140 P. 242], where the grantor reserved an un-
qualified right to revoke on the face of the deed, which granted 
a remainder in fee to vest in possessioii at the termination of 
the grantor's life estate. It was there held that the grantee 
acquired a remainder subject to a condition subsequent, and 
that "The power to revoke did not operate to destroy, or in 
anywise to restrict the effect of the deed as a present convey-
ance of a future vested interest.'' ( 167 Cal. 570, 578 ; see, also, 
Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 642-643 [154 P. 306]; 
Scott, The Law of Trusts, 1939, vol. 1, § 57.1.) These cases 
are distinguishable from those on which defendant relies to 
sustain her contention that the grantor's reservation of a 
right to revoke renders the delivery conditional. (See Kenney 
v. Parks, 125 Cal. 146, 150-151 [57 P. 772]; Moore v. Trott, 
156 Cil. 353, 357 [104 P. 578, 134 Am.St.Rep. 131] ; Long v. 
Ryan, 166 Cal. 442, 445 [137 P. 29] .) The latter cases were 
eases of gift, and the court was concerned with the problem 
of attempted testamentary disposition without compliance 
with the statute of wills. In those cases, the grantors reserved 
the right to recall their deeds from the depositary. It was 
found that the respective grantors did not intend any interest 
to pass to the grantees when the deeds were given to the 
depositary, but only intended an interest to pass at the time 
of their death. The right to revoke was, therefore, a right to 
recall the deed, and attached to the delivery and not to the 
interest granted. [4b] In the present case, the deed was 
executed and delivered to the trustees, not to accomplish any 
testamentary purpose, but to discharge Thomas' obligations 
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under the contraet he entered into with Merinoeth to compro-
mise their conflicting claims to Chloie 's estate. 'l'his contract 
vested Merinoeth with an equitable title to the remainder, since 
he had a specifically enforceable right to have 'rlwmas convey 
the legal title. The legal title was conveyed when the deed 
was delivered to the trustees under a binding contract that 
made the delivery irrevocable. (Cannon v. Handley, supra; 
McDonald v. Huff, supra; Pot hast v. Kind, 218 Cal. 192, 195 
[24 P.2d 771] ; see, also, Brunoni v. Brunoni, 93 Cal.App.2d 
215, 219 [208 P.2d 1028] .) Although Thomas could have 
accomplished the same result by delivering a deed to Merinoeth 
with the same reservations as those set forth in the trust agree-
ment (see Tennant v. John Tennant Memon'al Home, supra) 
-just as in the cases like Bury v. Young, supra, the same 
result could be accomplished by delivery to the grantee of a 
deed granting a remainder interest-the effect of the trans-
action is the same : Merinoeth acquired a vested remainder 
subject to divestment should he breach the terms of the trust 
agreement. 
The only question remaining is the order that should now 
be made by this court. Merinoeth contends that the part of 
the judgment refusing to quiet title in him should be reversed 
with directions to enter a judgment quieting his title to the 
property and that the part of the judgment refusing to quiet 
title in Louise should be affirmed because she did not appeal. 
This contention cannot be sustained. 
The trial court determined that Merinoeth did not obtain 
an interest under the deed and therefore refused to quiet title 
either in him or in Louise. If Merinoeth did not acquire a 
remainder interest, Louise could acquire nothing by the exe-
cution sale. Apparently in the belief that as a result of the 
judgment each party would get half the property as a! heir 
of Thomas, Louise did not appeal. Merinoeth appealed, con-
tending that he acquired a remainder interest under the deed, 
that the execution sale did not pass any interest to Louise, and 
that he was therefore entitled to the property. Had Louise 
appealed, her position could only be that Merinoeth acquired 
a remainder interest and that the execution sale was effective. 
That contention, however, would concede the first half of 
Merinoeth 's proof-that he acquired a remainder interest-
a concession fatal to a claim that she was entitled to half the 
property as an heir of Thomas. She was apparently willing 
to let the judgment stand and take half an interest as heir 
rather than risk an adverse ruling with respect to the execu-
Mar. 1954] OsBORN v. OsBORN 
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tion sale, which would leave her with nothing. [11] "[T]he 
failure to take an appeal demonstrates only satisfaction with 
the judgment as is, not as changed by a partial reversal. One 
may elect to stand upon a judgment which, he believes, al-
though largely in his favor, does not give him all of the benefits 
to which he is entitled. To avoid the time and expense of 
further litigation, he may be persuaded to permit the unfav-
orable portions to stand in reliance upon the benefits received 
in the other parts." (Ameriwn Enterprise~ Inc. v. Van 
Winkle, 39 Cal.2d 210,221 [246 P.2d 935].) 
[12] Both parts of the judgment turned on the trial 
court's construction of the deed and agreement. It refused 
to quiet title in Merinoeth on the ground that he did not 
acquire an interest by the deed and agreement; it refused to 
quiet title in Louise for the same reason. Since both parts of 
the judgment embrace the identical issue-did Merinoeth 
acquire a remainder interest under the deed-we have juris-
diction to review the entire judgment. (American Enter-
prise, Inc. v. Van Winkle, supra, 39 Cal.2d 210, 217; Blacke 
v. Blache, 37 Cal.2d 531, 538 [233 P.2d 547] ; Milo v. Prior, 
210 Cal. 569, 571 [292 P. 647] ; Whalen v. Smith, 163 CaL 
360, 362 [125 P. 904, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1319) .) Our decision 
that a remainder interest passed under the deed removes the 
basis of the trial court's decision adverse to Louise and un-
less the entire judgment is reversed she will be denied an 
opportunity to establish her claim that the execution sale was 
valid. A complete reversal is therefore appropriate. (Blache 
v. Blache, supra; Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796, 798 [221 
P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152]; Estate of Murphey, 7 Cal.2d 712, 
717 [62 P.2d 374]; cf. Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal.2d 602, 
609 [248 P.2d 910].) 
The judgment is reversed. The parties are to bear their 
own costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
reversal of that portion of the judgment from which plaintiff 
appealed, which reads as follows: ''That plaintiff take noth-
ing by reason of his amended complaint herein and that de-
fendant Louise L. Osborn have judgment for costs of court 
expended in the sum of $ ____ , '' but I dissent from the 
holding of the majority that the judgment against defendant 
368 OsBORN v. OsBORN [42 C.2d 
and cross-complainant from which no appeal was taken must 
also be reversed. That portion of the judgment reads as 
follows : ''That cross-complainant take nothing by reason of 
her cross-complaint herein, and that cross-defendant Merinoeth 
R. Osborn have judgment for costs of court expended in the 
sum of$ '' 
It is obvious from a reading of the majority opinion that 
the two portions of the judgment above quoted are separate 
and distinct and that they are in nowise interdependent, or 
that the portion from which plaintiff and cross-defendant has 
appealed is so connected with the remainder, from which 
no appeal was taken, that the appeal from the first part af-
fects the second part and involves a consideration of the 
whole judgment. This conclusion is manifest from the face 
of the majority opinion itself where it discusses in detail both 
the facts and the law relating to plaintiff's side of the case 
but only gives a passing reference to the basis upon which 
defendant and cross-complainant claims title to the property. 
The majority opinion does not purport to hold that there 
would have been merit in an appeal prosecuted by defendant 
and cross-complainant if such an appeal had been taken. 
Notwithstanding this situation, the majority directs the re-
versal of the entire judgment so that the claims of the de-
fendant and cross-complainant set up in her cross-complaint 
may again be litigated in the trial court. 
In so holding the majority goes outside of the record in 
suggesting possible reasons why defendant and cross-com-
plainant did not appeal, as if her reasons for not appealing 
had any bearing whatever upon the scope of review of this 
court on an appeal by plaintiff from the portion of the 
judgment against him. Until the decision of this court in 
Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal.2d 602 [248 P.2d 910], it was the 
settled rule that "when an appeal is taken from a part of a 
judgment or order not so intimately connected with the re-
mainder that a reversal of the part appealed from would 
require a reconsideration of the whole case in the court be-
low, an appellate court can review only the portion appealed 
from. The unaffected parts must be deemed final, and can 
be enforced pending the appeal." (See 4 Cal.J ur.2d, § 535, 
p. 389.) This rule has been followed in every case decided 
by this court prior to the Hamasaki case, supra, and it has 
never been departed from except in the Hamasaki case. In 
Glassco v. El Sereno Cot[ntry Club, Inc., 217 Cal. 90 [17 P.2d 
703], the late Chief Justice Waste, speaking for a unanimous 
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court, said (p. 91): "Preliminarily, it might be said that that 
portion of the judgment denying the appellants a lien, and 
which is attacked by the plaintiffs in their brief herein, is not 
properly a subject of review upon this appeal because of the 
insufficiency of the notice of appeal. The notice states that 
the appeal is 'from so much of the judgment herein as denies 
relief to the plaintiffs against the said defendant, Clotilde 
G. Castruccio . . . ' The notice of appeal makes no mention 
of that separate and distinct portion of the judgment denying 
plaintiffs a lien. It is elementary that an appeal from a por-
tion of a judgment brings up for review only that portion 
designated in the notice of appeal. (2 Cal.Jur. 155, sec. 25.) 
While it is true that notices of appeal are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to hearing causes on their merits (Harrel-
son v. Miller & Lux, 182 Cal. 408, 414 [188 Pac. 800] ), we 
are of the opinion that the notice filed in the present case does 
not present 'a mere misdescription' of the judgment, calling 
for the application of said rule, but rather presents a situa-
tion somewhat analogous to that presented in Dimity v. 
Dixon, 74 Cal.App. 714, 718 [241 Pac. 905], viz., one where 
the description of that portion of the judgment appealed 
from is so clear and unmistakable as to preclude a description 
of that portion of the judgment denying appellants a lien.'' 
The following cases fully support the rule that an appellate 
court has jurisdiction to review the portion of the judgment 
appealed from only unless the part appealed from is so inter-
woven and connected with the remainder, or so dependent 
thereon, that the appeal from a part affects the other parts 
or inYolves a consideration of the whole, and is really an 
appeal from the whole judgment: Lake v. Superior Court, 
187 Cal. 116 [200 P. 1041]; G. Ganahl Lbr. Co. v. We1:nsveig, 
168 Cal. 664 [143 P. 1025] ; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360 
r 125 P. 904, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1319] ; In re Burdick, 112 Cal. 
387 r44 P. 734]; Luck v. L1wk, 83 Cal. 574 [23 P. 1035]; 
Early v. Mannix, 15 Cal. 149; Pacific Mutnal L. I. Co. v. 
Fisher, 106 Cal. 224 [39 P. 758]. 
It must be remembered that the judgment denying plain-
tiff relief was based upon his complaint and the evidence 
offered by him in support of the allegations of the complaint 
that he was the owner of the property as a result of the deed 
executed by his father and placed in escrow to be delivered 
to plaintiff upon his father's death. The judgment denying 
defendant relief was based upon the allegations of her cross-
complaint that she was the owner of the property as the 
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result of an execution sale under a judgment against plaintiff. 
It seems to me that if this court has the power to review the 
portion of the judgment against the defendant, it should 
determine on this appeal the validity of the execution sale 
and the conveyances under which defendant claims and then 
reverse the entire judgment with directions to render judg-
ment either in favor of plaintiff or defendant, thus bringing 
an end to the litigation. However, the majority does not 
purport to do this but nevertheless reverses the judgment 
against the defendant who did not appeal therefrom and 
makes no contention that the judgment against her was 
erroneous. 
Section 938 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: ''Any 
person aggrieved may appeal in the cases prescribed in this 
title. The party appealing is known as the appellant, and 
the adverse party as the respondent." (Emphasis added.) 
It goes without saying that plaintiff could not have appealed 
from the portion of the judgment against the defendant, since 
he was not aggrieved thereby, and defendant could not have 
appealed from the portion of the judgment against plaintiff 
for the same reason. Therefore, plaintiff appealed from· the 
only portion of the judgment from which he could lawfully 
appeal. 
Section 956 of the Code of Civil Procedure which covers 
the matters which may be reviewed on appeal from a judg-
ment concludes with the following sentence : ''The provisions 
of this section do not authorize the court to review any de-
cision or order from which an appeal might have been taken.'' 
The clear implication of this provision is that the court may 
not review any decisions or order from which an appeal might 
have been but was not taken. Applying this provision to the 
case at bar it seems clear that this court is not authorized 
to review the judgment against defendant from which no 
appeal was taken. 
To summarize, it appears that the plaintiff appealed from 
the portion of the judgment denying the relief demanded by 
him in his complaint. The majority opinion holds that his 
appeal is meritorious. The relief demanded by defendant 
was by way of cross-complaint and the judgment denied her 
such relief. She did not appeal. It is conceded that her 
claim of title is based upon instruments entirely separate 
and apart from the instruments on which plaintiff's claim 
of title is based. Defendant has not sought to have this court 
review the portion of the judgment denying her relief on her 
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cross-complaint. It is obvious that the portion of the judg-
ment denying her relief on her cross-complaint is in nowise 
related to the portion of the judgment denying plaintiff the 
relief demanded in his complaint. There is no interdependence 
between the two portions of the judgment. Such being the 
case, it is clear under both the code provisions relating to re-
view on appeal and the authorities which I have cited above 
that the review here should be limited to the portion of the 
judgment from which plaintiff appealed, and that the judg-
ment against defendant from which no appeal was taken 
should not be reviewed. 
As stated earlier in this opinion the only case holding to 
the contrary is Hamasaki v. Flotho, supra. The decision 
in that case was based upon the theory advanced by the ma-
jority that even though there was no appeal from the judg-
ment and only an appeal from an order granting a limited 
new trial, this court had the power to review the judgment 
because it felt required to do so "in the interests of jus-
tice.'' There was no question of any interdependence in the 
Hamasaki case as there was only one judgment and one order, 
both of which were in favor of the respondent. The majority 
now rely upon the Hamasaki case as authority for reversing 
the judgment against defendant in the case at bar from which 
no appeal has been taken. Certainly the Hamasaki case is 
not authority for the holding in this case. The other cases 
relied upon by the majority clearly fall within the exception 
to the rule that where the part of the judgment appealed 
from is so interwoven and connected with the remainder, or 
so dependent thereon, that the appeal from a part affects the 
other parts or involves a consideration of the whole, that it 
is really an appeal from the whole judgment. The case at 
bar does not fall within this rule as clearly appears from what 
I have heretofore stated. 
It should be noted that the foregoing rule relates only to 
judgments which are not divisible into separate parts. And 
in order .for the rule to be applicable, the judgment, on its 
face, must disclose that the part appealed from is interwoven 
with or dependent upon other parts not appealed from. In 
other words, unless the interdependence of the separate parts 
of the judgment appears upon the .face of the judgment itself 
there can be no basis for holding that the part appealed .from 
is so interwoven and connected with the remainder, or so 
dependent thereon, that the appeal from a part affects the 
other parts or involves a consideration of the whole judg-
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ment. Since the judgment in the case at bar is in two sep-
arate and distinct parts or paragraphs and neither makes any 
reference to the other, there is no basis whatever for a hold-
ing that they are in any way interwoven with or dependent 
upon each other. 
The effect of the majority holding in this case is not only 
to create confusion in the law, as it undoubtedly will, but 
it places an additional burden on both appellate and trial 
courts to review portions of judgments from which no appeal 
is taken in clear violation of the statutory provisions which 
I have heretofore cited. The right of appeal is clearly statu-
tory as well as the scope of review. The Legislature has sought 
to limit the power of appellate courts to review only such 
portions of judgments as may be appealed from. This legisla-
tion has a dual purpose. First, to reduce the amount of work 
required by an appellate court in disposing of an appeal, and 
second, to limit the issues which may be retried in the trial 
court in the event of a reversal which should have the effect 
of saving the time of both the trial court and litigants. It now 
appears that the majority of this court not only ignores this 
salutory legislation but overrules the long line of authorities 
upholding and applying such legislation without even mention-
ing either the legislation or the authorities. The majority 
claims the right to do this "in the interests of justice." How-
ever, it has been aptly stated that "Justice is what is well 
established" and that "Justice is compliance with the written 
laws.'' I find no basis for the holding of the majority in this 
case in any concept of justice with which I am familiar. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. It is my view that the dissent-
ing opinion of Mr. Justice McComb of the District Court of 
Appeal, Second District, Division Two (Osborn v. Osborn 
(1953; Cal.App.), 256 P.2d 653, 657), correctly disposes of 
the legal issues presented by the undisputed facts alleged, 
proved, and found in this case. I shall state the facts in 
somewhat greater detail than they are stated by Justice 
McComb in order that I may hereinafter point out those facts 
which, in my opinion, have caused the majority of this court 
to announce an erroneous view of the applicable law. 
In order to compromise a dispute as to who was entitled 
to the property of Chloie I. Osborn, deceased mother of plain-
tiff Merinoeth and wife of Thomas D. Osborn, plaintiff and 
Thomas on June 27, 1939, executed a contract entitled "Stipu-
lation.'' The validity of this contract is not questioned. On 
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,July 21, 1939, such contract was filed in the proceeding for 
probate of the estate of Chloie I. Osborn. It provides in mate-
rial part that the probate court may set aside disputed real 
property (Lot 97) to Thomas as having been the homestead of 
Thomas and Chloie; that Thomas "will execute either by deed, 
contract or declaration of trust sufficient documents, convey-
ances or declarations so that . . . Lot 97 . . . will be retained 
in the name of Thomas D. Osborn, during his lifetime and 
that the same should vest in his son Merinoeth R. Osborn at 
the time of the demise of the said Thomas ... [A]ll income 
on the property will go to and belong to 'rhomas D. Osborn 
during his lifetime and out of the said sum of monies received, 
he will pay all ordinary and usual expenses, such as, main-
tenance, taxes, repair and ordinary improvements due to 
wear and tear. Any surplus from said amounts shall belong 
to Thomas . . . This Stipulation shall be binding upon the 
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the parties 
hereto.'' 
Pursuant to this agreement the probate court on July 21, 
1939, determined that Lot 97 had been the homestead of 
Thomas and Chloie and set it aside to Thomas as his separate 
property. 
On July 7, 1939, Thomas signed a grant deed of Lot 97 
to plaintiff Merinoeth, "reserving to the grantor the exclu-
sive possession and the use and enjoyment in his own right 
of the rents, issues and profits of said property . . . during 
the term of his natural life. This deed is executed in accord-
ance with the terms and conditions of that certain trust 
agreement of July 7th, 1939, ... and is subject to all con-
ditions, exceptions and reservations as in said trust agreement 
provided.'' 
The "trust agreement" of July 7 provides that "the said 
deed is to be turned over and delivered to the trustees herein 
[ Finkenstein and Warner] to be used, delivered and held 
under the terms and conditions in this agreement set forth''; 
the deed shall reserve to Thomas, the grantor, a life estate 
and ''the right to revoke the deed in the event second party 
[Merinoeth] wilfully harms grantor, and second party re-
serves the right to cancel this agreement if grantor wilfully 
harms second party"; the only powers and duties of the 
trustees are to keep the deed and not record it during the 
life of Thomas and to deliver it to Merinoeth only on the 
death of Thomas, and to defend against any attempt by 
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either party "to break the terms of the within trust agree-
ment'' ; Thomas ''agrees to will any and all right, title, or 
interest he may have in said real property to'' Merinoeth; 
the agreement is binding on the heirs, executors, and assigns 
of the parties; and "the wilful failure or refusal of either 
party to comply with the obligations herein provided, on 
his part to be performed, shall permit either party to rescind 
this agreement and shall confer upon the grantor the right 
to cancel the within mentioned deed and this agreement.'' 
On January 14, 1946, Merinoeth, Thomas, and the trustees 
executed an ''agreement cancelling trust agreement.'' In 
March, 1946, by an exchange of letters, the parties agreed 
to rescind the cancellation agreement. These two agreements 
were executed in the course of unsuccessful negotiations be-
tween Thomas and plaintiff for the purchase by Thomas of 
plaintiff's interest in Lot 97. Evidence of the negotiations 
and the cancellation agreements and accompanying letters 
has probative value as it tends to show that Thomas recognized 
that Merinoeth had a valuable remainder interest. 
The opinion of Justice McComb disposes of the issues raised 
by the above stated facts in the following manner: 
"Questions: First: Did the trial court properly decline 
to quiet title in the parcel of land in question in plaintiff? 
"Yes. The following rules are here pertinent: 
"(1) An escrow is a written instrument or personal prop-
erty which is delivered to a third party by the grantor, maker, 
promisor or obligor to be held by the depositary until the 
happening of a designated event or the performance of a 
designated condition and then to be delivered to the grantee, 
promisee or obligee. ( Civ. Code, § 1057. See also cited 
cases in 10 Cal.Jur. [1923] Escrows, § 1, n. 2, p. 576.) 
"(2) When a deed is deposited by a grantor with a third 
person to be handed to the grantee on the death of the grantor 
. . . without any intention of a present transfer of title, 
but on the contrary, with the intention of the grantor to 
reserve the right of dominion over the deed and the right 
to revoke or recall it there is no effective delivery. . . . 
(Williams v. Kidd [1915], 170 Cal. 631, 637 et seq. [151 P. 1, 
Ann. Cas. 1916E 703] .) 
"(3) Plaintiff in a quiet title action must depend on the 
strength of his own title and not on the weakness of that 
of defendant. Thus, if he fails to prove title in himself, 
he is not entitled to recover. (Alspach v. Landrum [1947], 
82 Cal.App.2d 901, 903 [1] [187 P.2d 130]; Tanner v. Title 
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Ins. & Trust Co. [1942], 20 Cal.2d 814, 825 [13] [129 P.2d 
383] .) 
"Applying the foregoing rules to the facts in the present 
case we find that under rule ( 1) the handing of the deed 
to defendants Finkenstein and Warner created an escrow, 
and since Mr. Osborn reserved the right to revoke or cancel 
the deed upon the happening of certain conditions, there 
was no intent to make an unconditional delivery of the deed. 
Therefore, it not having been delivered to plaintiff prior to 
his father's death, under rule (2) the deed was never delivered 
and no title passed to plaintiff. Hence, under rule ( 3), 
plaintiff having failed to prove title in himself the trial court 
properly held that he was not entitled to have title quieted 
in him. 
''Second: Was there substantial evidence to sustain the 
trial court's finding that the transaction between the parties 
did not create a trust agreement but merely created an 
escrow? 
"Yes. The transaction falls squarely within the definition 
of an escrow as set forth under rule (1) supra. There is a 
total absence of any of the elements of a trust agreement. 
Therefore the court's finding is supported by substantial 
evidence.'' 
The majority herein proceed upon the fallacious premise 
that ''Thomas was bound by the terms of the trust agreement, 
executed contemporaneously with the deed, not to attempt to 
recall the deed from the possession of the trustees . . . 
Thomas did not retain control over the deed after he delivered 
it to the trustees. There is nothing in the trust agreement, 
or external to it, to indicate that Thomas did not intend the 
transmission of the deed to the trustees to be a valid legal 
delivery." Obviously such "finding" by the majority in-
vades the province of the trier of fact and draws inferences 
from both the documents and the surrounding circumstances 
contrary to those drawn by the trial judge. Why was an 
escrow created and conditions for cancellation specified if 
the delivery was unconditional1 Furthermore, I cannot agree 
that "Thomas was bound by the terms of the trust agree-
ment." The signing by Thomas of the July 7 trust agree-
ment and deed was, at best, an ineffective attempt to perform 
the June 27 agreement. It appears that the June 27 agree-
ment, rather than the trust agreement, was binding and 
enforceable. And the June 27 agreement has never been 
discharged by performance or otherwise. 
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The majority opinion here appears to be an attempt to 
give, or to lay the foundation for giving, plaintiff Merinoeth 
and the nonappealing cross-complainant Louise a remedy 
akin to quasi-specific enforcement of the June 27 agreement. 
But that is a remedy which Merinoeth should have sought 
against the representatives of the estate of his deceased father, 
and Merinoeth has not seen fit to institute such proceedings 
and proceed on such a theory. 
For the reasons above stated I should affirm the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 25, 
1954. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[Sac. No. 6273. In Bank. Mar. 1, 1954.] 
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